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et al.: Education

EDUCATION
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1:
The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support
of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of
this state may be educated.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
70 6
Reform Educational Financing Inequities Today v. Cuomo.
(decided December 27, 1993)

Appellants claimed, inter alia, that their rights under the Equal
Protection Clauses of both the New York State70 7 and the
Federal70 8 Constitutions were violated by the state's practice of
70 9
basing the financing of education on property tax valuation.
Furthermore, appellants contend that the state's financial scheme
for education failed to satisfy the Education Article of the New
York State Constitution. 7 10 The appellate division held that
706.

, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44 (2d Dep't 1993).

A.D.2d

707. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Section 11 states:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state
or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color,
creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights
by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by
the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.
Id.
708. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 states in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Id.
709. R.E.F.LT.,

_

A.D.2d at

_,

606 N.Y.S.2d at 46.

710. Id.; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 states: "[t]he legislature shall provide
for the maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein
all the children of this state may be educated." Id.
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disparities between property-poor and property-rich school
districts are not unconstitutional, when Appellants did not allege
a failure of the state to provide a sound, basic education. 7 11
The appellant, maintained that gross disparities existed between
low-wealth and high-wealth school districts as a result of the
inequities in the distribution of approximately eight billion dollars
in state aid throughout the state's seven hundred school
districts. 7 12 As a result of these disparities, the appellants
claimed they did not possess the required funds to establish
comparable quality education as offered by the wealthier school
districts. 7 13 The trial court granted the respondent's motion to
dismiss. 7 14 This appeal to the Appellate Division, Second
7 15
Department followed.
The New York State Constitution, article XI, section 1, states
that "[tjhe legislature shall provide for the maintenance and
support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the
children of this state may be educated." 716 In 1925, in an effort
to equalize educational opportunities throughout the state and
sustain its obligation under the requirements of the New York
State Constitution, the state implemented the Cole-Rice Law. 7 17
This system is the foundation of the tax distribution system that
remains largely in place today. This tax system guarantees each
district a minimum amount of state aid per pupil based on average
daily attendance. 7 18 The system does not take into consideration
the wealth or poverty of the district in its formula. 7 19 Individual
711. R.E.F.LT.,
A.D. 2d at _, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
712. Reform Educ. Financing Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 152 Misc. 2d
714, 715, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969, 970 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1991). This action

was commenced by the R.E.F.I.T., its 40 member school districts, 21 school
districts from Long Island who participated individually, and several students
who were enrolled in these districts. Id. at 45.
713. R.E.F.LT.,
A.D.2d at _, 606 N.Y.S. 2d. at 46.
714. Id. at

715.
716.
717.
718.

_,

606 N.Y.S.2d at 45.

Id.
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
1925 N.Y. Laws 675.
R.E.F.LT., 152 Misc. 2d at 720, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 973. (emphasis

added).

719. Id.
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school districts are free to supplement their budgets by the use of
local taxes based on the full valuation of real property. 720 The

value of local properties, thus, becomes the determinate factor in
the differential of per student funds between districts. 72 1 Recent
budget cuts in state aid have exacerbated the situation. The 1993
New York State school aid budget was reduced by $460 million
dollars from the 1992 budget. 722 More than half of these cuts
affected the Long Island school districts. 723 Wealthier school

districts have been able to maintain their level of services as a
result of available monies from a richer tax base, thereby,
724
enabling these districts to absorb the reduced state aid.
Property-poor districts, on the other hand, have been unable to
replace the millions of dollars lost through budget cuts, resulting
7 25
in a devastating impact on their services.
State imposed educational mandates have become the current
dilemma facing low wealth school districts. In recent years, the
State has increasingly imposed costly mandates on school districts
726 It
without providing any state funds for their implementation.
720. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id. at 721, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
723. Id. at 721-22, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
724. Id. at 722, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
725. Id. Suffolk County's William Floyd School District, the poorest
district in the county, has become the top tax rate district in the state in its
effort to supplement reduced state aid. Despite its $101.50 per $1000
valuation, it is unable to maintain either the services or the per pupil funding of
wealthier districts. William Floyd maintains the lowest per pupil expenditure at
$7,107, while in contrast other districts have been able to spend as much as
$43,000 per pupil. Id. at 718, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 972. Furthermore, they have
been forced to abandon numerous programs and have the largest class sizes on
Long Island. Id. at 719, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
726. Id. at 719-20, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 973. These mandates have added to the
already overburdened property-poor school districts and have created an even
greater disparity in the per pupil expenditures between property-wealthy and
property-poor districts. Id. "These [property-poor] districts have been forced
to finance such costly mandates as asbestos removal programs by cutting funds
from operating budgets, reducing teaching and other staff eliminating
educational programming, or making other sacrifices detrimental to their
educational mission." Id. at 720, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
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is this system, whereby real property wealth determines the
amount of state aid provided, that the appellants claimed violated
the Educational Article of the New York Constitution 727 and the
Equal Protection Clauses of both the New York 728 and
Federal7 29 Constitutions.
In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily on Board of
Education v. Nyquist,7 30 because the claim in that case closely
paralleled the present case. In Nyquist, the constitutionality of
New York's public school funding was challenged by numerous
property-poor districts.7 3 1 The taxpayers, school officials,
students and boards of education of four large cities intervened
and asserted constitutional violations resulting from educational
and non-educational financial burdens peculiar to large cities. 732
In Nyquist, the New York Court of Appeals took notice of the
context in which the particular legal issues were raised. It
observed that New York's per pupil expenditures were very
nearly the highest in the country. 733 In addition, the court noted
that although both plaintiffs attacked the inequities of the state
-funding, which resulted in "educational unevenness," neither
party asserted that the educational services or facilities were
below the state-wide minimum standards fixed by the Board of
Regents.734
727.
728.
729.
730.
731.

N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11.
U.S. CONS'r. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982).
Id. at 35-36, 439 N.E.2d at 361, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 616.

732. Id. Special financial "metropolitan overburden[s]" consisted of: (1)
local funds for education creating an excessive demand on municipal budgets,
(2) reduction in the purchasing power of the "municipal education dollar," (3)
reduced state funding as a result of greater student absenteeism, inherent in
large inner city schools, (4) a greater concentration of students with special
educational requirements. Id. at 36, 439 N.E.2d at 362, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
733. Id. at 38, 439 N.E.2d at 363, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 647. The total public
elementary and secondary school expenditure for fiscal 1981-82 was $9.6
billion dollars. $4 billion of that figure was state aid, with the remainder being
appropriated through local taxes. Id. at 38 n.2, 439 N.E.2d at 363 n.2, 453
N.Y.S. 2d at 647 n.2.
734. Id. at 38, 439 N.E.2d at 363, 453 N.Y.S. 2d at 647-48.
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In Nyquist, the Fourth Amendment equal protection issue was
decided within the guidelines set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.735 In Rodriguez, the Court found that decisions
involving public school financing fall within the scope of
educational policy and as such are appropriately within legislative
determination. 736 Justice Powell reasoned that educational policy
was inappropriate for strict judicial scrutiny. 737 Instead, Justice
Powell held that the rational basis test was the proper standard
738
against which to examine the Texas school financing system.
The court in Nyquist, applying rational basis scrutiny,
determined that there was a rational relationship between the
state's funding system and a legitimate state purpose. The interest
being "the permission and encouragement of participation in and
739
control of public schools at the local district level."
The Nyquist court, using the reasoning articulated in
Rodriguez, applied rational basis scrutiny to the state
constitutional equal protection challenge. 740 The court concluded
that the plaintiffs had failed to show the total absence of a
relationship between the state's interest in "preservation and
promotion of local control of education," and the present
financing system. 74 1 The state-wide flat grant of $360 per pupil
was held to be immune from attack under the Equal Protection
735. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The case involved a class action suit brought on

behalf of school children of low income families residing in property poor
districts. The equal protection challenge was based upon reliance by the Texas'
school financing system on local property taxation. Id. at 4-5.
736. Id. at 55.

737. Id. at 35. The court stated that this case did not fall within the
traditional suspect class nor fundamental right classification of equal protection
analysis. Id. at 18.
738. Id. at 35. The Court held that Texas' public school financing system
did not effect a 'suspect class,' Id. at 28. Furthermore, education, although an
area of immense significance was not deemed a 'fundamental right,' and as
such strict scrutiny could not be applied. Id. at 40.
739. Ayquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 41, 439 N.E.2d at 365, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 649
(quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S at 49).

740. Id. at 44, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
741. Id.
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Clause of the New York State Constitution, because on its face,
no inequality existed in this scheme of financial distribution
which allocated to all districts without differentiation. 742
Finally, the court in Nyquist considered the claim that the
school financing system violated the Education Article of the
New York State Constitution. 743 The Nyquist court observed that
the language of the constitution "makes no reference to any
requirement that the education to be made available be equal or
substantially equivalent in every district."' 744 Under the current
system, the court noted, the average per pupil expenditure
exceeds that in all other states except two, and as such, the state
is meeting its constitutional requirement of providing a sound
basic education. 745 More importantly, the court acknowledged:
Because decisions as to how public funds will be allocated among
the several services for which by constitutional imperative the
Legislature is required to make provision are matters peculiarly
appropriate for formulation by the legislative body (reflective
and responsive as it is to the public will), we would be reluctant
to override those decisions by mandating an even higher priority
for education in the absence, possibly, of gross and glaring
74 6
inadequacy ...
The appellants in R.E.F.LT. acknowledged the holding in
Nyquist, but contended that the increased budget cuts and state
mandates since the Nyquist decision, resulted in such a "gross
and glaring inadequacy as to warrant" present judicial
response. 747
The Appellate Division, Second Department found that
although the disparities between districts have widened, the
appellants have not alleged the students are receiving a sub
standard education. 74 8 In addition, it was already determined by
the court of appeals in Nyquist, that such disparities are not
742. Id. at 46, 439 N.E.2d at 367-68, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
743. Id. at 47, 439 N.E.2d at 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
744. Id.
745. Id. at 48, 439 N.E.2d at 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
746. Id.
747. R.E.F.LT., __ A.D.2d at _, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
748. Id.
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unconstitutional. 7 4 9 The- court held that the Supreme Court,

Nassau County, properly dismissed the complaint. 750
In their evaluation of the constitutionality of public educational
systems funded primarily through local property tax assessments,
both the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez75 1 and the
New York Court of Appeals in Nyquist752 have reached similar
conclusions. Both of these courts have established that equal

protection guarantees do not extend to equal educational funding,
that rational basis scrutiny will be applied to any state education
funding scheme, 753 and that the legislature is the proper arena to
determine the adequacy of education.

749. Id.
750. Id. at
606 N.Y.S.2d at 46-47.
751. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
752. 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982).
753. But see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986) (asserting that the
holding in Rodriguez has not "definitively settled the question of whether a
minimally adequate education is a fundamental right" and if a state statute
should discriminatory infringe upon that right, whether heightened scrutiny
should be accorded) Id. at 285; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221
(1982) ("Public education is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the
Constitution .... But neither is it merely some governmental 'benefit'
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.") (citations
omitted)).
_,
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